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I. INTRODUCTION
The "clear and present danger test" is among the most famous
doctrinal formulations in the history of American law. The test was
originally proposed by the Supreme Court as a measure of the outer
boundaries of the government's power to punish written or spoken
advocacy of violence or other unlawful action. It has subsequently been
* Professor of Political Science, DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois.
invoked to address other kinds of problems, including some that are
unrelated to the scope of First Amendment protection of freedom of
speech and the press. Its principal continuing use in American law,
however, is to define the constitutional limits of the government's power
to punish antigovernment speech, and, in particular, written or spoken
advocacy of violence or other unlawful action.
In recent years, references to the danger test have appeared in the
decisions of British courts and the institutions responsible for enforcing
the European Convention on Human Rights. As in American law, those
references occur most often in cases in which government is alleged to
be exceeding constitutional limits on its power to punish antigovernment
speech.
This article will examine the role that the danger test has played in the
decisions of American courts and, more recently, in the decisions of
British courts and the enforcement organs of the European Convention.
Part I will briefly trace the immediate Anglo-American constitutional
background from which the danger test emerged. It particular, it will
examine the way in which the common law offense of seditious libel
was defined by British judges and judicial commentators in the late
nineteenth century. Part II will focus on the evolution in American law
of judicial attempts to articulate both a "content-based" and an "effects-
based" approach to imposing restrictions on the government's power
to punish antigovernment speech. A common theme of content-based
approaches has been an insistence that government cannot punish speech
unless it consists of "direct incitement" to unlawful action. The dominant
but not exclusive effects-based approach to protecting speech has been
the application of the "clear and present danger" test. Part III will
explore the use by British and European judges of content-based and
effects-based approaches to protecting speech. From its inception, the
danger test has had a complex and uneasy relationship with judicial
approaches to protecting speech that focus on the content of speech
rather than its consequences or effects. As the test begins to find occasional
adherents among non-American courts and judges, that relationship is
once again attracting attention and generating controversy.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS PRECEDING THE DANGER TEST
The clear and present danger test did not emerge from a constitutional
vacuum. Many of the twentieth century American cases in which the
danger test is discussed were prosecutions for statutory offenses with
roots in the English common law of seditious libel. In addition, about a
decade after the adoption of the Constitution and the First Amendment,
the U.S. Congress enacted anti-sedition legislation in the form of the
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Sedition Act of 1798.' The constitutional questions that arose during and
immediately after World War I had therefore been considered by earlier
generations of British and American judges and judicial commentators.
James Fitzjames Stephen's "codification" of the common law of
seditious libel serves as the starting point of many discussions of the
modem meaning of the offense.2 Stephen examined the history and
current state of the common law in the second volume of his History of
the Criminal Law of England, published in 1883. 3 Quoting his earlier
Digest entry on the subject, he defined a "seditious intention" as
an intention to bring into hatred or contempt, or to excite disaffection against
the person of Her Majesty... or the Government and Constitution of the United
Kingdom ... or either House of Parliament, or the administration of justice, or
to excite Her Majesty's subjects to attempt otherwise than by lawful means the
alteration of any matter in Church or State by law established, or to raise
discontent or disaffection amongst Her Majesty's subjects, or to promote
feelings of ill-will and hostility between different classes of Her Majesty's
subjects.4
Stephen's description of the multi-faceted offense of seditious libel
had an earlier incarnation in the American Sedition Act of 1798. Section
2 of the Act made it a crime for any person to
write, print, utter or publish.., any false, scandalous and malicious writing or
writings against the government of the United States, or either house of the
Congress of the United States, or the President of the United States, with intent
to defame [them], or to bring them ... into contempt or disrepute; or to excite
against them . . . the hatred of the good people of the United States, or to stir up
sedition within the United States, or to excite any unlawful combinations
therein, for opposing or resisting any law of the United States .... 5
1. An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, 1 Stat.
596 (1798).
2. See, e.g., Law Commission, Codification of the Criminal Law: Treason, Sedition
and Allied Offences 41-42 (Working Paper No. 72, Second Programme, Item XVIII,
London, 1977); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 505-06
(Harvard Univ. Press 1967) (1941); LAURENCE LUSTGARTEN & IAN LEIGH, IN FROM THE
COLD: NATIONAL SECURITY AND PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 207-08 (1994); MICHAEL
SUPPERSTONE, BROWNLIE'S LAW OF PUBLIC ORDER AND NATIONAL SECURITY 234-35
(Butterworths 2d ed. 1981).
3. 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
(London, Macmillian 1883).
4. Id.at298n.1.
5. An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, 1 Stat.
596 (1798), reprinted in JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND
SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES app. 441-42 (1956). See generally
STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC McKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 257-302, 537-79, 590-93
From the perspective of modem understandings of the scope of
freedom of speech, the offenses prohibited by the common law, like
those prohibited by the Sedition Act of 1798, fell into two distinct
categories. First, one could violate the law by "exciting" unlawful action.
Thus, the common law prohibited "excit[ing] Her Majesty's subjects to
attempt otherwise than by lawful means the alteration of any matter in
Church or State," 6 while the Sedition Act prohibited "excit[ing] any
unlawful combinations [for] opposing or resisting any law."7 In principle,
these components of the common law and the Sedition Act would be
acceptable in a modem political system, because they define punishable
speech not as "mere criticism" of the government or as dissemination
among the population of antigovernment sentiments, but as incitement to
the use of "unlawful combinations",8 or "unlawful means" 9 for the
purpose of bringing about social or political change.
By modern standards, the remaining offenses prohibited by the
common law and the Sedition Act are more problematic. Thus, the
common law prohibited words or writings that were intended to "raise
discontent or disaffection" among the population or to "promote feelings
of ill-will and hostility between different classes." 0 The Sedition Act
outlawed bringing the government or its leaders into "contempt or
disrepute" or exciting against them the "hatred of the good people of the
United States."' Popular discontent or disaffection can, of course, lead
eventually to antigovernment violence. At the same time, increased
discontent is the inevitable by-product of the dissemination of critical
comments about the government or its leaders. Defining seditious libel
as the creation of "discontent or disaffection" therefore positioned
government to punish the simple expression of antigovernment views
and exempted government from the need to ascribe to speech any
capacity to produce violence or other secoidary unlawful consequences.12
Stephen emphasized the antilibertarian implications of allowing
government to punish not only incitement to unlawful action but also the
creation of feelings of discontent or disaffection among the population.
(1993); JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS (1952);
GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 15-78 (2004).
6. 2 STEPHEN, supra note 3, at 298 n. 1.
7. SMITH, supra note 5, at 442.
8. Id.
9. 2 STEPHEN, supra note 3, at 298 n.1.
10. Id.
11. SMITH, supra note 5, at 442.
12. See generally LEONARD W. LEvy, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985);
FREDRICK SEATON SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND 1476-1776 (1952);
Philip Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and the Control of the
Press, 37 STAN. L. REv. 661 (1985).
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By the end of the eighteenth century, he argued, the practical effect of
the full spectrum of offenses that comprised the common law could be
succinctly described as conferring upon government the power to punish
"the intentional publication [of] written blame of any public man, or of
the law, or of any institution established by law."' 13 It was "obvious," he
said, that the "practical enforcement of this doctrine was wholly
inconsistent with any serious public discussion of political affairs."' 14
Stephen also argued, however, that during the course of the nineteenth
century, the meaning of seditious libel had narrowed. In particular, he
was confident that by the time he was writing, "nothing short of direct
incitement to disorder and violence [was] a seditious libel.,' 5 He also
famously argued that the scope of the offense of seditious libel depends
on whether the ruler is regarded as "the superior of the subject" or as the
subject's "agent and servant., 16 "To those who hold [the latter] view fully
and carry it out to all its consequences," he said,
there can be no such offence as sedition. There may indeed be breaches of the
peace which may destroy or endanger life, limb, or property, and there may be
incitements to such offences, but no imaginable censure of the government,
short of a censure which has an immediate tendency to produce such a breach of
the peace, ought to be regarded as criminal.
17
Stephen deftly blended objective historical scholarship and normative
assertions into a persuasive account of the content of the common law at
the end of the nineteenth century. To the extent that his conclusions
were sound, English law retained some but not all of the component
parts of the overall offense of seditious libel. On the one hand, it was no
longer a crime to intend, as an end in itself, to bring the officials or
institutions of government "into hatred or contempt" or to raise "discontent
13. 2 STEPHEN, supra note 3, at 353.
14. Id. at 348. Stephen traced the origins of this broad conception of seditious
libel to various sources, including Chief Justice Holt's charge to the jury in Queen v.
Tutchin, 14 State Trials 1095 (Q.B, 1704). Tutchin was on trial for publishing articles
alleging that the government of the day was corrupt and that the navy was mismanaged.
Tutchin's counsel argued, according to Holt, that the papers were "innocent." Holt
responded that it was hardly innocent to "endeavor ... to possess the people that the
government is mal-administered by corrupt persons," because, he said, "[i]f people
should not be called to account for possessing the people with an ill opinion of the
government, no government can subsist. For it is very necessary for all governments that
the people should have a good opinion of it." Id. at 1128.
15. 2 STEPHEN, supra note 3, at 375.
16. Id. at 299.
17. Id. at 300.
or disaffection" among the population. At the same time, some
antigovernment expression could still be punished. In particular,
government retained the power to punish "direct incitement to disorder
and violence."18 In addition, "censure of the government" could still
be a criminal offense, provided it had "an immediate tendency to
produce... a breach of the peace."'
' 9
Stephen's conclusions about seditious libel anticipate the discussion
that commenced in the American legal community following America's
entry into World War I. Judges focused on whether written or spoken
words opposing the war or the draft consisted of "direct incitement" to
unlawful action. Punishment of such incitement was generally held to be
permitted by the First Amendment, but there was disagreement about
whether other forms of incitement-including "indirect incitement"--could
also be punished.2 ° Judges also focused on the circumstances in which
speech was delivered and on the likelihood that it would produce unlawful
action. Within this stream of cases, however, there was disagreement
about whether speech could be punished because of its "natural and
probable consequences" or only when it created a "clear and present
danger" of bringing about unlawful action.2'
III. SPEECH CONTENT, SPEECH EFFECTS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In American law, judicial enunciation of both a content-based theory
of protected speech and the effects-based "clear and present danger" test
occurred in response to enforcement of the Espionage Act of 1917.22
The Act was passed by Congress on June 25, 1917, about two months
after the United States entered World War I. Title I of the Act made it a
criminal offense-"when the United States is at war"-(1) to "cause or
attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty,
in the military or naval forces of the United States," or (2) to "obstruct
18. Id. at 375.
19. Id. at 300. Stephen's understanding of the state of the law was incorporated
into the summing up of Judge Cave in R. v. Burns, 16 Cox C.C. 355 (1886). Judge Cave
informed the jury that "the right of free discussion is [perfectly] unlimited, with the
exception, of course, that it must not be used for the purpose of inciting to a breach of the
peace or to a violation of the law." Judge Cave then quoted Stephen's Digest entry and
told the jury that it "stated very clearly" the law upon the question of what is seditious
and what is not." Id. at 359; see also R. v. Aldred, 22 Cox C.C. 1, 3 (1909) (Judge
Coleridge summed up, "[t]he test [in a prosecution for seditious libel] is this: was the
language used calculated, or was it not, to promote public disorder or physical force or
violence in a matter of State?")
20. See infra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
22. Espionage Act, 40 Stat. 217 (1917).
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the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States., 23 An additional
section of the law-Title XII--declared "nonmailable" any publication
which violated the criminal prohibitions of the Act.24
A. Speech Content and Government Power
The first sustained judicial scrutiny of the Espionage Act occurred
within a month of its passage and involved invocation by the
government of its Title XII powers to control access to the mails. The
U.S. Postmaster General (Burleson) ordered the Postmaster of New
York City (Patten) to exclude from the mails a forthcoming issue of a
left-wing monthly journal called "The Masses." The editor of the
journal brought suit to restrain Patten from executing the Postmaster
General's order, and the case came before Judge Learned Hand of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.25
The banned issue of "The Masses" included articles opposing
conscription and praising two of the most prominent anarchists of the
time-Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman. Both had recently been
arrested for conspiring to induce draft resistance in violation of the
Selective Service Law, which Congress had passed on May 18, 1917.
One article in "The Masses," entitled "Friends of American Freedom,"
argued that readers should admire the "courage and devotion" of the
defendants.
26
Judge Hand granted The Masses' request for an injunction. He did so
by narrowly construing those provisions of the Espionage Act that made
it a crime to cause insubordination or obstruct recruitment. Hand
conceded that incitement to unlawful action "may be accomplished as
well by indirection as expressly, since words carry the meaning they
impart..." 27 He also conceded that "[p]olitical agitation, by the passions
it arouses or the convictions it engenders, may in fact stimulate men to
the violation of law., 28 He insisted, however, that
23. Id.
24. Id. The classic study of the Espionage Act and its implications for freedom of
speech is ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 2. See
also STONE, supra note 5; PAUL L. MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1979); HARRY N. SCHEIBER, THE WILSON ADMINISTRATION
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 1917-1921 (1960).
25. Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
26. Id. at 544.
27. Id. at 540.
28. Id.
to assimilate agitation, legitimate as such, with direct incitement to violent
resistance, is to disregard the tolerance of all methods of political agitation
which in normal times is a safeguard of free government. .... If one stops short
of urging upon others that it is their duty or their interest to resist the law, it
seems to me one should not be held to have attempted to cause its violation.29
Hand then examined the contents of The Masses and concluded that
none of the articles could be thought "directly to counsel or advise
insubordination or mutiny' 3° or to constitute "direct advocacy of resistance
to the recruiting and enlistment service."' The only passages that gave
him pause were those in which Goldman and Berkman had been praised
for their illegal activities. "That such comments have a tendency to
arouse emulation in others is clear enough," Hand said,
but that they counsel others to follow [is] not so plain. Literally at least they do
not.... One may admire and approve the course of a hero without feeling any
duty to follow him. There is not the least implied intimation in these words that
others are under a duty to follow. The most that can be said is that, if others do
follow, they will get the same admiration and the same approval. 32
Hand's approach to the task he faced is noteworthy in three respects.
First, he does not deny that "[p]olitical agitation [may] stimulate men to
the violation of law."3 3 Thus, he concedes that antigovernment speech
can create a danger of bringing about unlawful consequences. Second,
however, he insists that judges should focus on the content of written or
spoken advocacy rather than its consequences. His own effort to do so
yields the conclusion that only "direct incitement" to unlawful action
should be punishable.34 Finally, he expresses some ambivalence about
how to define "direct incitement." On the one hand, he argues that it
consists solely of "urging upon others that it is their duty or their interest
to resist the law."3 5 On the other hand, he concedes that "this may be
accomplished as well by indirection as expressly, since words carry the
meaning that they impart.,
36
Hand's decision in Masses was an early and thoughtful effort to
articulate a content-based approach to placing limits on the
government's power to punish advocacy of unlawful action. It was not
the law for very long, however, because shortly thereafter it was
reversed by a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals.37
29. Id.
30. Id. at 540-41.
31. Id. at 541.
32. Id. at 541-42.




37. Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
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Speaking for that court, Judge Rogers noted that Hand "thought no crime
had been committed ... because the publication did not in so many words
directly advise or counsel a violation of the act.",38 "This court," Rogers
said,
does not agree that such is the law. If the natural and reasonable effect of what
is said is to encourage resistance to a law... it is immaterial that the duty to
resist is not mentioned .... That one may willfully obstruct the enlistment
service, without advising in direct language against enlistments... seems to us
too plain for controversy. 39
Judge Rogers thus emphatically rejected Hand's attempt to articulate a
narrow, content-based definition of punishable advocacy of unlawful
action. In addition-in his reference to the "natural and reasonable
effect of what is said"-Rogers anticipated the shift in judicial focus that
would occur a little over a year later when Justice Holmes handed down
the Supreme Court's unanimous decisions in Schenck v. United States
40
and Debs v. United States.4'
B. Schenck and the Birth of Clear and Present Danger
Holmes' "danger test," like Hand's "incitement test," came in response to
the government's decision to aggressively enforce the Espionage Act of
1917. Schenck and a second defendant were convicted of violating the
Act by sending an antidraft leaflet to men who had been called for
military service. As described by Holmes, the leaflet
intimated that conscription was despotism in its worst form and a monstrous
wrong against humanity in the interest of Wall Street's chosen few. It said "Do
not submit to intimidation," but in form at least confined itself to peaceful
measures such as a petition for the repeal of the act.4 3
38. Id. at 37-38.
39. Id. at 38. Elsewhere in his opinion, Rogers insisted that "[a]dmiration of
conspirators convicted of [obstructing the draft] is equivalent to an approval of their
crime and an encouragement to others to disobey the law in like manner." Id. at 36. He
reinforced this point by expressing full agreement with the statement of U.S. Circuit
Judge Charles Hough, who, in an earlier procedural phase of the Masses litigation, had
insisted that "[i]t is at least arguable whether there can be any more direct incitement to
action than to hold up to admiration those who do act." Id. at 38 (quoting the opinion of
Judge Hough in Masses, 245 F. at 106).
40. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
41. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
42. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49.
43. Id. at 51.
Schenck argued that the leaflet was protected by the First Amendment.
Holmes responded that
in ordinary times the defendants.., would have been within their constitutional
rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which
it is done.... The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war,
many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort
that their utterance will not be endured .... It seems to be admitted that if an
actual obstruction of the recruiting service were proved, liability for words that
produced that effect might be enforced .... If the act, (speaking, or circulating
a paper,) its tendency and the intent with which it is done are the same, we
perceive no ground for saying that success alone warrants making the act a
crime. 44
In principle, Holmes' opinion in Schenck was a major improvement on
approaches to protecting speech that permitted the government to punish-
speech based on its "natural and reasonable consequences" or its "bad
tendency" to produce unlawful action. By insisting that speech create a
"clear and present danger" of bringing about unlawful action, Holmes
appeared to tighten the required nexus between advocacy and unlawful
action before advocacy could be punished. At the same time, the
opinion presents numerous problems.
First, it is not clear whether Holmes actually used the danger test to
decide Schenck. Within a few sentences of his enunciation of the "test," he
concludes that antidraft advocacy that is not successful can nevertheless
be punished based on "its tendency and the intent with which it is
done. 45  The speech-protective benefits of the danger test are of
course obliterated if it is nothing more than a synonym for the "bad
tendency" test of punishable speech.
Second, even if Holmes was using the danger test, it is unclear how
assiduously he applied it. Apart from noting that a war was on and that the
leaflet was sent to draftees, Holmes offers no evidence to support his
conclusion that the leaflet created a "clear and present danger" of obstructing
recruitment. Presumably the danger posed by such a leaflet could range
all the way from the possibility that a single recruit would be moved to
resist the draft to the possibility that the recruiting service itself would be
seriously disrupted. Judicial predictions about whether speech will
create a particular danger are by definition arbitrary-indeed, one of the
most telling criticisms of the danger test is that invites pure acts of
judicial speculation-but Holmes apparently felt little need even to
speculate.
44. Id. at 52.
45. Id.
[VoL. 7: 263, 2006] The Clear and Present Danger Test
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
Third, the danger test invites judges in cases of alleged incitement to
consider not only the "nature" of the defendant's words but also the
"circumstances" in which they are delivered. Permitting judges to take
into account the circumstances in which antigovernment speech occurs
will provide them with an opportunity to uphold the punishment of
speech whose content does not come close to constituting "direct
incitement." This possibility will be most pronounced, of course, during
time of war or other emergencies.
Finally, it can be argued that the danger test in inherently flawed
because it protects antigovernment speech as long as no one is listening
but authorizes punishment when such speech begins to find a receptive
audience. In the case of antiwar speech, it means that constitutional
protection vanishes at precisely the time when people have a reason to
want to express themselves, that is, when a war has begun.46
The clear and present danger test as proposed in Schenck, therefore,
was not a particularly sturdy libertarian tool. The fragile status of the test
was reinforced a week after Schenck when Holmes wrote a further
unanimous opinion for the Court upholding the Espionage Act conviction
of Eugene Debs. Debs was a long-time leader of the Socialist Party and
a prominent antiwar activist. The charges against him were based on a
public speech in which he condemned the war and lauded the courage of
antiwar activists. Holmes concluded his opinion for the Court, in which
the danger test is never even mentioned, by noting that "the jury were
most carefully instructed that they could not find the defendant guilty for
advocacy of any of his opinions unless the words used had as their
46. The history and merits of the danger test have inspired a steady stream of
scholarly commentary. See generally ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 148-60
(1985); CHAFEE, supra note 2; HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH IN AMERICA 119-236 (Jamie Kalven ed. 1988); James E. Boasberg, Seditious
Libel v. Incitement to Mutiny: Britain Teaches Hand and Holmes a Lesson, 10 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 106 (1990); Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern
First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments from History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1975);
Hans A. Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg
Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970); Sheldon M. Novick, The Unrevised Holmes
and Freedom of Expression, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 301; Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of
Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger,
70 CAL. L. REV. 1159 (1982); Bernard Schwartz, Holmes Versus Hand: Clear and
Present Danger or Advocacy of Unlawful Action?, 1994 Sup. CT. REV. 209; Frank R.
Strong, Fifty Years of "'Clear and Present Danger": From Schenck to Brandenburg-and
Beyond, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 41.
natural tendency and reasonably probable effect to obstruct the
recruiting service ....
The significance of Holmes' initial contributions to the jurisprudence
of the First Amendment is therefore quite ambiguous. On the one hand,
the danger test was a promising doctrinal mechanism for protecting all
but a small portion of antigovernment speech from criminal punishment.
On the other hand, by formally inviting judges to take into the account
the "circumstances" in which speech is uttered when deciding whether it
is likely to produce unlawful action, Holmes diverted attention from
what is arguably the simpler and more relevant question of whether
speech should only be punishable when it consists of "direct incitement"
to unlawful action.4 8 Finally, of course, Holmes substantially muddied
the waters by failing to choose in his own opinions between requiring a
"clear and present danger" and allowing government to punish speech
based on its "natural tendency and reasonably probable effect.,
49
Over the next fifty years, the Supreme Court returned periodically to
the question of the scope of the government's power to punish advocacy
of violence or other unlawful action. The principal cases involved
prosecutions of political dissidents for violating state or federal laws
aimed at the suppression of radical political ideologies such as anarchism,
syndicalism, socialism, and communism. Given the notorious American
cultural antipathy to such ideologies, it is not surprising that the free
speech claims of defendants in these cases did not fare well in the courts.
C. The Danger Test from Schenck (1919) to Brandenburg (1919)
In Gitlow v. New York, the Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment
challenge to the conviction of a member of the "Left Wing Section" of
the Socialist Party.50 The defendant had distributed a fervent but turgid
"Manifesto" condemning not only capitalism, but also "moderate
socialism," and calling for "annihilation of the bourgeois parliamentary
state.",51 He was charged with violating New York's "criminal anarchy"
statute, which prohibited advocating "the doctrine that organized
47. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919).
48. See generally Gunther, supra note 46.
49. In Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), Holmes, in dissent, reiterated
his belief that the United States may punish speech that produces "a clear and imminent
danger" of bringing about substantive evils. He insisted, however, that on the facts of
the case-which he described as "the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an
unknown man"--there simply was no danger. Id. at 628.
50. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
51. Id. at 656 n.2.
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government should be overthrown by force or violence."5 2 The Court
concluded that it could not "hold that the [statute was] an arbitrary or
unreasonable exercise of the police power of the State unwarrantably
infringing the freedom of speech or press. 53
Two years later, in Whitney v. California, the Court reviewed the
conviction of a political activist who had participated in a convention
called to organize a branch of the Communist Labor Party of America.54
She was convicted of violating California's "criminal syndicalism"
statute, which made it a crime to advocate "the commission of crime,
sabotage, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing
a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any political
change. 5 5 As it had in Gitlow, the Court concluded that the statute did
not violate the First Amendment because it was not "an arbitrary or
unreasonable attempt to exercise authority vested in the State in the
public interest.,
56
The Supreme Court in both Gitlow and Whitney concluded that it was
irrelevant whether the defendants' expressive activities had created a
clear and present danger of bringing about unlawful action. It reasoned
that the state legislatures in each case had determined that advocacy of
radical political doctrine "involve[s] such a danger of substantive evil
that [it] may be punished [irrespective of] whether any specific utterance
coming with the prohibited class is likely, in and of itself, to bring about
the substantive evil."
57
Justice Holmes (joined by Justice Brandeis) dissented in Gitlow. He
argued that "[e]very idea is an incitement .... But whatever may be
thought of the redundant discourse before us it had no chance of starting
a present conflagration., 58 Brandeis (joined by Holmes) wrote an opinion
in Whitney that is widely regarded as a classic statement of the danger
52. Id. at 654. Discussions of this period include ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN,
POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA: FROM 1870 TO THE PRESENT (1978);
ROBERT K. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 1919-1920 (1955);
WILLIAM PRESTON, JR., ALIENS AND DISSENTERS: FEDERAL SUPPRESSION OF RADICALS,
1903-1933 (University of Illinois Press, 2nd ed., 1994) (1963).
53. Gidow, 268 U.S. at 670.
54. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
55. Id. at 359-60. Similar or identical laws were passed by about two-thirds of the
states between 1917 and 1920. See ELDRIDGE FOSTER DOWELL, A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL
SYNDICALISM LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1939).
56. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 371.
57. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 670.
58. Id. at 673.
test in its most protective form.59 "To justify suppression of free speech,"
Brandeis said, "there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious
evil will result" and that the "danger apprehended is imminent.,
60
There matters stood until the Supreme Court decided Dennis v. United
States in 1951.61 The case involved federal legislation-the Alien
Registration Act, better known as the "Smith Act"-which, like the New
York statute at issue in Gitlow, prohibited advocating the overthrow of
the government by force or violence. The principal purpose of the
legislation was to destroy the U.S. Communist Party, but the wartime
alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union prevented the
government from acting. Once the Cold War began, however, the Party
became the target of an intense campaign of repression.62 On July 20,
1948, the government brought Smith Act charges against twelve leaders
of the Party. Following a tumultuous nine-month trial--"the longest
criminal trial in American legal history" 63-- eleven of the defendants
were convicted.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Vinson
authored a plurality opinion in which he spoke for himself and three
other justices. He conceded that courts should decide the danger issue
even when the legislature has outlawed speech itself (as Congress had
done in the Smith Act). As a result, he concluded, the Court in Dennis
was "squarely presented with the application of the 'clear and present
danger' test, and must decide what that phrase imports.'
64
Having accepted the need to apply the danger test, however, Vinson
then invoked the facts of the Dennis case to articulate a fundamentally
revised version of the test itself. The Communist Party, he said, was a
well-disciplined group with the patience to refrain from attempting to
overthrow the government until the time was right. An attempt to
overthrow the government would therefore not necessarily occur
immediately. Moreover, no matter when it occurred, it would not
necessarily be successful. But even a futile attempt to overthrow the
59. Brandeis' opinion was technically a "concurrence," because, he said, the
existence of a danger could not be ruled out, and, in any case, Whitney had not properly
raised the issue in the lower courts.
60. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376.
61. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
62. The history of the Smith Act, from its inception to its application to the
Communist Party in the postwar period, is recounted in MICHAL R. BELKNAP, COLD WAR
POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE SMITH ACT, TI-E COMMUNIST PARTY, AND AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES (1977). See also DAVID CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR: THE ANTI-COMMUNIST
PURGE UNDER TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER (1978); STONE, supra note 5, at 311-426;
William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: The Background
of Dennis v. United States, 2001 SuP. CT. REV. 375.
63. STONE, supra note 5, at 396.
64. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 508.
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government, Vinson said, would do great harm to the nation. As a result, he
concluded, it is "impossible to measure the validity [of punishing
Communist advocacy of violent overthrow of the government] in terms
of the probability of success, or the immediacy of a successful
attempt. 6 5
Vinson chose instead to adopt a version of the danger test that had
been proposed by Judge Learned Hand, who by this time was Chief
Judge of the Court of Appeals from which the Dennis case had been
appealed. The question that courts must ask in cases such as Dennis,
Hand had decided, is "whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to
avoid the danger., 66 The version of the danger test proposed by Hand
allows the government to punish speech even when it is unlikely to bring
about unlawful action, provided the unlawful action itself is sufficiently
"grave." The effect of adoption by the Dennis Court of Hand's version
of the danger test was to deprive the type of advocacy with which the
Communist Party was identified of all constitutional protection.67
Within a few years of its decision in Dennis, however, the Court
substantially stiffened its resistance the government's use of the Smith
Act to prosecute the Communist Party. In Yates v. United States, the
Court reversed the convictions of fourteen "second-string" leaders of the
Communist Party.65 Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan ruled that the
trial judge had taken an overly broad view of the meaning of the Smith
Act's prohibition of advocacy of forcible overthrow of the government.
The jury had been instructed that they were entitled to convict the
defendants even though the evidence showed, at most, that they had
engaged in advocacy of forcible overthrow of the government as an
65. Id. at 509.
66. Id. at 510 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)).
67. Justices Jackson and Frankfurter concurred in the Court's decision, but neither
was willing to rely on the danger test to reach his conclusion. Justices Douglas and
Black not only applied the danger test but also concluded that no danger existed. As
Justice Douglas put it,
There comes time when even speech loses its constitutional immunity. ...
That is the meaning of the clear and present danger test .... This record,
however, contains no evidence whatsoever showing that the acts charged viz.,
the teaching of the Soviet theory of revolution with the hope that it will be
realized, have created any clear and present danger to the Nation .... On this
record no one can say that petitioners and their converts are in such a strategic
position as to have even the slightest chance of achieving their aims.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 585, 588, 590 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
68. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
"abstract doctrine." According to Harlan, however, the defendants were
correct to contend, as they had before the Supreme Court, that the Smith
Act "proscrib[es] only the sort of advocacy which incites to illegal
action."'69 "The essential distinction," Harlan said, "is that those to whom
the advocacy is addressed must be urged to do something, now or in the
future, rather than merely to believe in something. 7 °
The Yates decision marked the first time in the twentieth century that
the Supreme Court as an institution had been willing to rebuff the
government's efforts to punish alleged advocacy of violence or other
unlawful action. It also represented an emphatic statement by the Supreme
Court that government cannot punish antigovernment speech unless it
consists of incitement to concrete unlawful action. Some forty years
after the Masses decision, therefore, the Court appeared to endorse Judge
Hand's insistence that courts should rely on a narrow, content-based
definition of punishable speech.
Yates made no attempt, however, to clarify the troubled status of the
clear and present danger test itself. The test had been proposed in
Schenck, overlooked in Debs, rejected in Gitlow and Whitney, and
eventually revived, but in mangled form, in Dennis. Not until 1969-in
Brandenburg v. Ohio--did the Court bring some closure to the question
of the kinds of advocacy that government is entitled to punish and the
circumstances in which punishment is constitutionally permissible.
D. The Brandenburg Synthesis
The defendant in Brandenburg was a Ku Klux Klan leader who
notified a Cincinnati television station of an upcoming Klan rally 7 1 The
station sent a reporter and a cameraman to the event, which included a
brief speech by the defendant in which he said, among other things, that
the Klan was "not a revengent [sic] organization, but if our President, our
Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian
race, it's possible that there might have to be some revengeance [sic]
taken. 72 Brandenburg was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism
statute of advocating "crime, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism
as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform. 73
The Supreme Court in its per curiam opinion acknowledged that in
Whitney the Court had upheld a similar statute "on the ground that,
without more, 'advocating' violent means to effect political and economic
69. Id. at 313 (emphasis in the original).
70. Id. at 324-25 (emphasis in the original).
71. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
72. Id. at 446.
73. Id. at 449 n.3.
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change involves such danger to the security of the State that the State
may outlaw it." 74 The Court insisted, however, that
Whitney has been thoroughly discredited by later decisions [which] have
fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting orproducing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.' 5
Brandenburg represented the culmination of fifty years of Supreme
Court consideration of the constitutional status of advocacy of unlawful
action. The decision was hailed by civil libertarians as finally vindicating
not only the wisdom of Hand's insistence on confining government to
the punishment of "direct incitement" but also the wisdom of Holmes'
promising but unfulfilled assertion that speech cannot be punished
unless it creates a "clear and present danger" of bringing about unlawful
* 76
action.
Ironically, however, a plausible reading of Brandenburg is that it did
nothing more than restate the constitutional conclusions to which Stephen
had come nearly one hundred years earlier. Stephen argued that at the
time he wrote-1883-seditious libel consisted, at most, of "direct
incitement to disorder and violence. 7 7 He also argued that in English
law "no imaginable censure of the government, short of a censure which
has an immediate tendency to produce [a] breach of the peace, ought to
be regarded as criminal. 78 Viewed in this light, Brandenburg symbolized
the fact that it had taken American law nearly a century to assimilate
principles governing the punishment of advocacy of unlawful action that
were recognized by British law by the end of the nineteenth century.
It is also important to note that Brandenburg failed to settle two
important issues left open by the Court's decision in Yates. First, Justice
74. Id. at 447.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 46, at 754-55.
Brandenburg combines the most protective ingredients of the Masses
incitement emphasis with the most useful elements of the clear and present
danger heritage . . . Under Brandenburg, probability of harm is no longer
the central criterion for speech limitations. The inciting language of the
speaker-the Hand focus on "objective" words-is the major consideration.
And punishment of the harmless inciter is prevented by the Schenck-derived
requirement of a likelihood of dangerous consequences.
Id.
77. 2 STEPHEN, supra note 3, at 375.
78. Id. at 300.
Harlan in his opinion in Yates affirmed the constitutional validity of
punishing advocacy of future as well as immediate unlawful action.
Innumerable judges and commentators, however, have insisted that
inherent in the concept of "incitement" is the requirement that speech
cannot be punished unless it is likely to incite immediate unlawful
action. In Brandenburg, the Court seemed to agree with the latter view,
but it also expressly preserved its own earlier decisions in Dennis and
Yates, both of which had endorsed the punishment of incitement to
future lawless action. In American law, therefore, it remains unclear
whether government is entitled to punish incitement not only to
immediate but also to future unlawful action.79
Second, neither Brandenburg nor any other Supreme Court decision
has delved very deeply into the question of what kinds of messages
should qualify as punishable "incitement." 80 Even if judges permit
government to punish only what is described as "direct incitement," the
question immediately arises of what kinds of messages are subsumed
under that label. In particular, if the only thing that constitutes "direct
incitement" is a declarative sentence that others are commanded to take
a particular action, government would be precluded from punishing a
broad spectrum of messages that are intended to produce unlawful action
and are highly likely to do so. Courts in the United States and other
jurisdictions will therefore soon experience great pressure to examine
the definition of punishable "incitement" and to consider including
messages other than simple declarations to take immediate or future
unlawful action.8'
IV. THE DANGER TEST IN BRITISH AND EUROPEAN LAW
We turn now to the decisions of British courts and the decision-
making organs of the European Convention on Human Rights, i.e., the
European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of
Human Rights. In British and European human rights law, recent
discussions of the scope of governmental power to punish advocacy of
unlawful action-and of the relevance of factors such as the content of
speech and its consequences-have occurred in two sets of cases. The
first "set" is represented by a single reported case, that of Patricia
79. For an argument that the danger test should not include a strict "imminence
requirement," see Redish, supra note 46, at 1180-82.
80. See id. at 1176 ("A never-resolved question, first brought out in [the] battle
between Learned Hand and Justice Holmes, was whether the first amendment ever
allowed sanctions for indirect unlawful advocacy.").
81. For a detailed examination of the ways in which speech can incite unlawful
action, see KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE (1989).
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Arrowsmith, whose conviction in the mid-1970s for violating the British
Incitement to Disaffection Act 1934 was reviewed first by the Court of
Appeal and then by the European Commission on Human Rights. The
second set of cases has been more numerous. Beginning in the late 1990s,
the European Commission and European Court have been receiving
a large number of applications from vocal supporters of Kurdish
independence who had been convicted of committing various offenses
prohibited by Turkish anti-sedition and anti-terrorism laws.
A. R. v. Arrowsmith (1974) and Punishable Incitement
The facts of the Arrowsmith case closely resemble those with which
the U.S. Supreme Court was faced in Schenck. Arrowsmith, a committed
pacifist, was arrested while distributing a leaflet on an army base in
England. 2 The leaflet was directed at soldiers who might be posted to
Northern Ireland, and, under the heading "Open refusal to be posted to
Northern Ireland," it said, in part, that
[a] soldier who publicly stated that he refused to serve in N. Ireland... would
be taking a courageous stand. . . . Better still, if a group of soldiers made this
announcement simultaneously it would make a great impact on public
opinion ... Such an action could lead to court martial and imprisonment. But
soldiers who believe, as we do, that it is wrong for British troops to be in N.
Ireland are asked to consider whether it is better to be killed for a cause you
do not believe in or to be imprisoned by refusing to take part in the
conflict... . WE WHO ARE DISTRIBUTING THIS FACT-SHEET TO
YOU HOPE THAT, BY ONE MEANS OR ANOTHER, YOU WILL AVOID
TAKING PART IN THE KILLING IN NORTHERN IRELAND. 83
Arrowsmith was convicted of violating the Incitement to Disaffection
Act 1934, which prohibits "endeavor[ing] to seduce any member of His
,,14
Majesty's forces from his duty or allegiance. She appealed to the
Court of Appeal.
Speaking for the Court of Appeal, Lawton LJ concluded that the




Alluding to the possible consequences of the leaflet, Lawton said that the
court was concerned with "the likely effects on young soldiers aged 18,
82. R. v. Arrowsmith, [1975] Q.B. 678, [1975] 1 All E.R. 463 (Court of Appeal
Criminal Division).
83. R. v. Arrowsmith, [1975] Q.B. at 683-84, [1975] 1 All E.R. at 466
(capitalization in the original).
84. Incitement to Disaffection Act, 8 Statutes 312 (1934).
85. R. v. Arrowsmith, [1975] Q.B. at 684, [1975] 1 All E.R. at 467.
19, or 20, some of whom may be immature emotionally and of limited
political understanding.
' 86
Arrowsmith appealed to the European Commission of Human Rights,
which held, by a vote of 11 to 1, that the applicant's right to freedom of
expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights had not been violated.87 The Commission agreed with the Court of
Appeal that the leaflet contained passages that "were to be understood,
or could have been interpreted by soldiers, as an encouragement or
incitement to disaffection." The Commission then noted that the applicant
had "suggested that the 'clear and present danger doctrine,' as developed
by the United States Supreme Court, be applied., 89 The Commission did
not explore this submission, except to say that the notion "necessary"-in
the affirmation in Article 10(2) of restrictions on freedom of expression
that are "necessary in a democratic society"- 'implies a 'pressing social
need' which may include the clear and present danger test and must be
assessed in the light of circumstances of a given case." 90  The
Commission then noted that
the Director of Public Prosecutions took into account, when deciding to consent
to prosecution, the difficult situation in Northern Ireland and the possible effect
[of the leaflet] if this campaign was not stopped. 91
In a separate and partially dissenting opinion, Mr. Opsahl conceded
that the applicant had engaged in "more or less explicit 'incitement',"
but he argued that if others "make use of information which has been
imparted to them with a view to influencing them, they do so mainly on
86. Id.
87. Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7050/75, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 218, 230
(1978) (Commission report). Under Article 10,
1. Everyone has the fight to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall
not prevent States from requiring licensing of broadcasting, television or
cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedom, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.
European Convention on Human Rights art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950.
88. Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7050/75, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 218, 232,
para. 91 (1978).
89. Id. at 233, para. 95.
90. Id.
91. Id. para. 96.
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their own responsibility. 92 He also argued that the applicant "did not in
the circumstances actually endanger national security or undermine
order in the army .... No link has been shown [between the applicant's]
specific acts and actual dangers to these interests. 9 3
Mr. Klecker authored a full dissent. He concluded, as had Mr. Opsahl,
that it was not clear that "national security would be endangered or crime
engendered by the applicant and her small band of supporters... ."94 He
also disagreed with the majority that the leaflet itself constituted
punishable incitement. The leaflet, he said,
could be considered as a passive form of encouragement or advocacy of the idea
that soldiers should leave the army either by going absent without leave or
refusing to serve in Northern Ireland. It is passive encouragement in the sense
that at no point does it openly advocate in strong terms that soldiers should
desert or disobey orders. 95
The opinions of various members of the European Commission in
Arrowsmith suggest that, at the very least, it is possible for judges to
disagree not only about whether speech creates a clear and present
danger-a question to which, by definition, there will never be a conclusive
answer-but also, and even in a rather straightforward case, about
whether the content of speech constitutes punishable "incitement."
96
The cases from Turkey confirm that while one or both of these issues
can sometimes elicit a consensual response from judges, they can also
produce genuine disagreement.
B. Kurdish Separatism and Freedom of Speech
Since the early 1990s, the European Commission has been receiving a
torrent of applications from persons who had been convicted of violating
Turkish anti-sedition and anti-terrorism laws for expressing support for
Kurdish independence or for the separatist activities of the Workers'
Party of Kurdistan (PKK). The applicants had been tried by a National
92. Id. at 236-37, para. 6 (Mr. Opsahl, separate opinion, dissenting in part).
93. Id. at 237, para. 7.
94. Id. at 241, para. 9 (Mr. Klecker, dissenting).
95. Id. at 240, para. 7. Mr. Klecker also agreed with Mr. Opsahl that "the aim of
influencing others who are themselves responsible for their actions is a legitimate feature
of the exercise of freedom of expression and that those who are persuaded to accept the
views expressed must carry their own burden of responsibility." Id. at 243, para. 13.
96. Cf LUSTGARTEN & LEIGH, supra note 2, at 210 (discussing the decision of the
Court of Appeal: "It is hard to imagine material that fits within the [Incitement to
Disaffection Act] more precisely, and [Arrowsmith's] appeal was rejected.").
Security Court (branches of which operated in various parts of the
country) and had appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Cassation.97
Most applicants had been convicted of violating Section 8 of the Prevention
of Terrorism Act 1991, which prohibited "[w]ritten or spoken propaganda,
meetings, assemblies and demonstrations aimed at undermining the
territorial integrity of the Republic of Turkey or the indivisible unity of
the nation."
98
The initial case to reach the European Court was Zana v. Turkey,99
which had been filed with the European Commission in 1991 and was
decided by the European Court in 1997. Eighteen additional cases were
filed between 1993 and 1995 and decided in 1999 and 2000. We will
look first at the Zana decision and then, as a group, at the additional
cases. 1
00
1. Zana v. Turkey
Zana was a former mayor of Diyarbakir, the largest city in the Kurdish
region of Turkey. In August of 1987, while incarcerated in Diyarbakir
military prison, and on the same day that a number of civilians were
killed by PKK militants, he made the following statement to journalists:
I support the PKK national liberation movement; on the other hand, I am not in
favour of massacres. Anyone can make mistakes, and the PKK kill women and
children by mistake ....
The statement was published in a national daily newspaper, and Zana
was subsequently convicted by the Diyarbakir National Security Court
of violating Article 312 of the Turkish Criminal Code, which at the time
97. See infra notes 110-13.
98. The various offenses with which applicants were charged are reprinted in full
in the decisions of the European Court in the individual cases. Cf infra notes 110-13.
For a case in which Section 8 of the Terrorism Act 1991 was among the offenses with
which the defendant was charged, see, e.g., Erdogdu v. Turkey, App. No. 25723/94, 34
Eur. H.R. Rep. 50, 1143, 1153 (2002).
99. Zana v. Turkey, App. No. 18954/91, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 667 (1997).
100. Given the large number of decisions handed down by the European Court, no
attempt will be made to explore the facts or special features of each case. In addition, no
attempt will be made to canvass the cases decided since 2000. The focus will be on the
broad pattern of outcomes in the cases decided between 1997 and 2000 and on the
significance that the Court or individual judges attached to the content of what the
defendant or defendants said or wrote and to the likelihood that it would produce
violence or other unlawful action. For further discussion of these cases and of their
significance for the rights of journalists and others under United Kingdom anti-terrorism
legislation-i.e., the Terrorism Act 2000 and the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act
2001-see Howard Davis, Lessons from Turkey: Anti-Terrorism Legislation and the
Protection of Free Speech, 1 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 75 (2005).
101. Zana v. Turkey, App. No. 18954/91, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 667, 673, para. 12
(1997).
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made it an offense (1) "publicly to praise or defend an act punishable by
law as a serious crime" and (2) "publicly to incite hatred or hostility
between different classes in society, thereby creating discrimination
based on membership of a social class, race, religion, sect or region."
' 0 2
The case reached the European Court via the European Commission,
which had decided that Zana's conviction did not constitute a violation
of his Article 10 right to freedom of expression.' 0 3 In reviewing the
Commission's decision, the Court indicated, as a preliminary matter, that
it would "look at the impugned interference [with Article 10 rights] in
light of the case as a whole, including the content of the remarks held
against the applicant, and the context in which he made them."',0 4 In the
Zana case itself, the Court said, it would "analyse the content of the
applicant's remarks in the light of the situation prevailing in south-east
Turkey at the time."'
'1 5
The Court concluded that Zana's remarks were "both contradictory
and ambiguous. '0 6 It also concluded, however, that it should not look at
the statement "in isolation" and noted that "the interview coincided with
murderous attacks carried out by the PKK on civilians in south-east
Turkey, where there was extreme tension at the material time."' ' This
consideration led the Court to conclude that "the support given to the
PKK ... by the former mayor of Diyarbakir, the most important city in
south-east Turkey... had to be regarded as likely to exacerbate an already
explosive situation in the region."' 8 The Court concluded, by a vote of 12
to 8, that having regard to various factors "and to the margin of
appreciation which national authorities have in such a case," there had
been no violation of Article 10.109
The approach that the European Court took to the Zana case would be
recognizable to anyone familiar with the Justice Holmes' "clear and present
danger test." Holmes had proposed that judges should be attentive both
to the "circumstances" in which words are used and to the "nature" of
the words themselves for the ultimate purpose of deciding whether they
create a "clear and present danger" of bringing about unlawful action.
102. Id. at 675, para. 31.
103. Id. at 667-75, para. 34.
104. Id. at 689, para. 51.
105. Id. at 690, para. 56.
106. Id. at 691, para. 58.
107. Id. at 691, para. 59.
108. Id. at 691, para. 60.
109. Id. at 691, para. 62.
The European Court stops short of declaring that Zana's words created a
"clear and present danger"-the Court concludes that the words were
"likely to exacerbate an already explosive situation"-but the conclusion
itself is based both on the content of the defendant's words and on the
circumstances surrounding their utterance.
2. The Post-Zana Decisions
The cases decided in the wake of Zana-eighteen in all in 1999 and
2000-can be divided into three groups. In most of the cases-fourteen
of the eighteen-the European Court concluded-either by a unanimous
vote, 110 or by a vote from which only Judge Golcuklu of Turkey
dissented'"'-that Turkey had violated Article 10 of the European
Convention. In two further cases, the Court reached the same
conclusion-that Article 10 had been violated-but did so by divided
votes of 12-5 and 11-6 respectively. 12 In the final two cases the Court
concluded, as it had in Zana, that Turkey had not violated Article 10. In
both cases, however, the Court was divided, reaching its decisions by
votes of 11-6 and 10-7 respectively." 3
The content and pattern of the Court's unanimous decisions holding
that there had been a violation of Article 10 were similar. In each case,
the Court concluded that the impugned publication-e.g., a book, article,
or published interview-did not "constitute" or did not "amount to" an
"incitement to violence." The Court also concluded-for various reasons,
e.g., the literary character of a published work, the low circulation of a
periodical-that it was unlikely that there would be any resulting
violence or serious impact on national security or public order. In one
formulation that appears in several decisions, the Court concluded that
the views expressed in the book (or article or published interview)
110. Incal v. Turkey, App. No. 22698/93, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 449 (2000); Arslan v.
Turkey, App. No. 23462/94, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 9 (2001); Polat v. Turkey, App. No
23500/94 (1999), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr; Okcuoglu v. Turkey, App. No. 24246/94
(1999), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr; Erdogdu & Ince v. Turkey, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.
185, 188; Baskaya & Okcuoglu v. Turkey, Apps. Nos. 23536/94 & 24408/94, 31 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 10, 292 (2001); Ozturk v. Turkey, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 277, 281; Ozgur
Gundem v. Turkey, App. No. 23144/93, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 49, 1082 (2001); Erdogdu v.
Turkey, App. No. 25723/94, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 50, 1143, 1153 (2002).
111. Ceylan v. Turkey, App. No. 23556/94, http://www.echr.coe.int/echr; Gerger v.
Turkey, App. No. 24919/94, http://www.echr.coe.int/echr; Surek v. Turkey (No. 2), App.
No. 24122/94, http://www.echr.coe.int/echr; Surek v. Turkey (No. 4), App. No. 24762/94,
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr; Sener v. Turkey, App. No. 26680/95, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34
(2003).
112. Karatas v. Turkey, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 81, 84; Surek & Ozdemir v. Turkey,
Apps. Nos. 23927/94 & 24277/94, http://www.echr.coe.int/echr.
113. Surek v. Turkey (No. 1), App. No. 26682/95, http://www.echr.coe.int/echr;
Surek v. Turkey (No. 3), App. No. 24735/94, http://www.echr.coe.int/echr.
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"cannot be read as an incitement to violence; nor could they be
construed as liable to incite to violence."
' 1 4
The two cases of most interest for our purposes are those in which the
European Court concluded-as it had in Zana-that Turkey had not
violated Article 10. In Surek v. Turkey (No. 1),11 5 which involved two
readers' letters published in a weekly review, the Court concluded that
"in the context of the security situation in south-east Turkey, [the]
content of the letters must be seen as capable of inciting to further
violence in the region."'" 6 In Surek v. Turkey (No. 3), 17 which involved
the publication of "news commentary" that proclaimed that the
Kurdistan national liberation struggle now "embrace[d] 50 districts in 8
provinces in the active front of armed struggle," the Court concluded
that the article "expressed a call for the use of armed force" and that its
content "must be seen as capable of inciting to further violence in the
region."1 
8
The foregoing pair of decisions elicited several dissents. All of the
dissents took exception either to the Court's conclusion that the
impugned expression constituted "incitement" to violence or to its
conclusion that, under the circumstances, the expression was likely to
produce violence--or to both conclusions. In Surek (No. 1), for instance,
Judge Palm questioned whether the Court had "attached too much
weight to the harsh and vitriolic language used in the impugned letters"
and too little to "the general context in which the words were used and
their likely impact."119 He concluded, after looking at a "combination of
[factors]," that "there was no real or genuine risk of the speech at issue
inciting to hatred or to violence."' 20 In a second dissent, Judges Tulkens,
114. See, e.g., Erdogdu & Ince v. Turkey, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 185, 188, para. 52;
Baskaya & Okcuoglu v. Turkey, Apps. Nos. 23536/94 & 24408/94, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep.
10, 292, 396-97 (para. 64) (2001); Erdogdu v. Turkey, App. No. 25723/94, 3 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 50, 1143, 1153 (para. 70) (2002). In the cases in which there was only one dissent
from the Court's conclusion that the government of Turkey had violated Article 10, the
dissenting judge-Judge Golcuklu of Turkey-emphasized either that there had been
incitement to violence, or that the circumstances were conducive to violence, or both.
The most complete presentation of his dissenting views appeared in Gerger v. Turkey,
App. No. 24919/94, http://www.echr.coe.int/echr.
115. Surek v. Turkey (No. 1), App. No. 26682/95, http://www.echr.coe.int/echr.
116. Id. para. 62.
117. Surek v. Turkey (No. 3), App. No. 24735/94, http://www.echr.coe.int/echr.
118. Id. para. 40.
119. Surek v. Turkey (No. 1), App. No. 26682/95, http://www.echr.coe.int/echr
(Palm, J., partly dissenting).
120. Id.
Casadevall and Greve emphasized that freedom of expression "may be
curtailed only when there is direct provocation to commit serious
criminal offences," and they doubted whether the published letters met
this standard. 21 In a third dissent, Judge Fischbach said he could not
"detect in the remarks made in the two letters [an] incitement to
violence."'
122
In Surek (No. 1), one dissenter-Judge Bonello-relied explicitly on
the "clear and present danger test."' 123 Quoting extensively from U.S.
Supreme Court decisions-and in particular from Justice Brandeis'
concurring opinion in Whitney v. California (1927)-Bonello concluded
that applicant's words "created no peril, let alone a clear.and present
one." 124 In Surek (No. 3), Judge Maruste authored a separate dissent in
which he also invoked the danger test. "I share the opinion of those
colleagues," he said, "who consider that the danger flowing from the
speech must be deemed clear and present. This was not the case here."'
125
In sum, the outcome in fourteen of the foregoing cases was that all or
all but one of the members of the European Court ruled against Turkey
because they concluded that the content of impugned expression did not
qualify as "incitement to violence" and/or that its utterance or publication
was not likely to lead to violence. In the two cases in which the Court
ruled in Turkey's favor-Surek (No. 1) and Surek (No. 3)-the majority
concluded that in the context of the security situation in south-east
Turkey, the impugned expression was capable of inciting further
violence. The dissenters asserted, however, that it was unlikely, under
the circumstances, that violence would result.
V. CONCLUSION
The clear and present danger test will soon be one hundred years old.
From its inception in Schenck through its invocation in recent decisions
of the European Court of Human Rights, it has served as a persistent but
erratic touchstone for judicial efforts to define the outer boundaries of
government power to punish advocacy of violence or other unlawful
action. What conclusions can be drawn about the role that the danger
test has played-and may yet play-in determining whether and when
121. Id. (Tulkens, J., Casadevall, J. and Greve, J., partly dissenting).
122. Id. (Fischbach, J., partly dissenting).
123. Id. (Bonello, J., partly dissenting).
124. Id. Judge Bonello's dissent is reiterated verbatim in Surek v. Turkey (No. 3),
App. No. 24735/94, http://www.echr.coe.int/echr, and, as a concurrence, in most of the
unanimous or near-unanimous decisions of the Court in which it concluded that Turkey
had violated Article 10. See supra notes 112, 113.
125. Surek v. Turkey (No. 3), App. No. 24735/94, http://www.echr.coe.int/echr
(Maruste, J., partly dissenting).
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advocacy of unlawful action should be entitled to constitutional protection
from government interference?
First, it seems reasonable to conclude that the formulation of the danger
test was an "inevitable" judicial event. Had the test not been proposed
by Justice Holmes in Schenck in 1919, it--or something very close to
it-would almost certainly have appeared, sooner or later, in some case
somewhere in which a judge or court was asked define how much
discretion government should have to punish political dissent. Unless
we decide to exempt all speech from punishment, judges will need to
determine when and why it is constitutionally permissible to punish
some speech. Judicial insistence on the proposition that speech can only
be punished when it creates a "clear and present danger" of bringing
about unlawful action is a plausible way of narrowly defining the
category of speech that government should be allowed to punish.
Once we agree on this proposition, however, it becomes necessary to
identify the factors on which to base the conclusion that a danger does or
does not exist. The two obvious candidates are the content of the speaker's
message and the circumstances in which it is expressed. Not every court
that has addressed the question of the constitutional status of advocacy
of unlawful action has described the required connection between speech
and action in terms of the necessity of a "clear and present danger."
Indeed, even the U.S. Supreme Court in Brandenburg took pains to
avoid using the phrase itself. Beginning at least with Stephen's ruminations
on the content of the common law of seditious libel, however, all judicial
commentary on the power of government to punish antigovemment
speech has insisted that before speech can be punished there should be
some connection between speech and unlawful action. In recent years,
moreover, most judges have insisted that speech must be clearly and
perhaps also immediately likely to produce such action. Finally, judicial
commentary has almost universally endorsed the wisdom of taking into
account both the content of speech and the circumstances in which it is
uttered before reaching a conclusion about whether the specified
connection between speech and action has been established.
A second conclusion about the danger test derives from its structure
and seems to be substantiated by the foregoing account of its use in
various jurisdictions. As originally proposed, the test defined punishable
speech as that which creates a "clear and present danger" of bringing
about violence or other unlawful action. To determine whether such a
danger existed, judges were invited to take into account both the content
of speech and the circumstances in which it was uttered. As a
mechanism for protecting freedom of speech, the test was therefore a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, it was far more demanding than
tests that permitted government to punish antigovernment speech
because it prevented the people from having a "good opinion" of their
government, 126 because it raised "discontent or disaffection" among the
population, 127 or because unlawful action was the "natural and reasonable
effect" of its utterance.' 28 On the other hand, by formally inviting judges
to take into account the "circumstances" in which written or spoken words
were uttered, the danger test enabled judges to uphold the punishment of
antigovernment speech that fell far short of direct incitement to unlawful
action. Certainly one lesson from the American experience is that the
danger test gave judges who were sympathetic to the government's view
of the dangers of speech an excuse to put to one side any doubts they
might otherwise have had about the inciteful content of the speech itself.
If the last point is valid, however, there is some irony in the fact that in
the cases from Turkey, it is the European Court judges who are most
supportive of freedom of speech who invoke the danger test to justify
their conclusions. Objectively speaking, the "security situation" facing
the government of Turkey in connection with the struggle for Kurdish
independence is almost certainly more serious than, say, the threat to
military recruitment or discipline in the U.S. army during World War I,
the threat to political stability in the United States in the 1920s or the
1950s, or the threat to discipline in the British army in connection with
its deployment to Northern Ireland. The symbolic significance of requiring
that speech must create a danger that is both "clear" and "present" before
it can be punished is evidently still highly attractive to judges who are
inclined to extend to antigovernment speech as much constitutional
protection as possible. Even in the context of a violent struggle for
independence, it leads such judges to downplay the possibility that the
"circumstances" in which separatist speech is expressed are particularly
conducive to violence and to conclude that the likelihood of violence has
been exaggerated by the authorities.
Of course, it is also true that the European Court is participating, along
with other European institutions, in an important campaign to encourage
Turkey to understand that ideas that "offend, shock or disturb" are
nevertheless entitled to constitutional protection and to pressure Turkey
126. Cf Queen v. Tutchin, 14 State Trials 1095, 1128 (Q.B. 1704) (Chief Justice
Holt's charge to the jury in Queen v. Tutchin).
127. Cf 2 STEPHEN, supra note 3 and accompanying text (Stephen's description of
one component of the common law of seditious libel the end of the eighteenth century).
128. Cf Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 38 (2d Cir. 1917), and accompanying
text (per Judge Rogers of the Court of Appeal).
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to build into its legal system respect for the values of "pluralism,
tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no 'democratic
society'.,', 29 It is nevertheless striking that the danger test and an emphasis
on the "circumstances" or "context" in which speech occurs are rallying
cries primarily for those judges who most consistently reject the decisions
of the Turkish government to punish vocal supporters of Kurdish
independence.
Finally, it is important to remember that whatever approach future
courts take to the constitutional status of advocacy of unlawful action,
they will need to address two questions that were never resolved by
American courts and have yet to be explored in detail in other
jurisdictions. First, while the concept of "incitement" suggests that the
punishment of advocacy of violence or other unlawful action should be
restricted to messages that urge immediate action, there is clearly a need
to accommodate within the category of punishable speech messages that
incite future action. Judicial emphasis on the need for immediate
unlawful action may have served a useful constitutional purpose when
governments were prepared to punish the expression of a broad spectrum
of antigovernment speech, including purely abstract calls for revolutionary
political action. The dangers posed by advocacy of terrorist violence are
real, however, and the fact that a particular message advocates violence
at some unspecified future time should not necessarily exempt it from
punishment.
Second, courts will need to address the question of what kinds of
messages qualify as "incitement," or, if the preferred term is "direct
incitement," what spectrum of messages is encompassed within that
term. Again, the emphasis in judicial decisions on the need for direct
incitement may have served a useful purpose when governments were
prepared to punish antiwar activists for describing the draft as "a
monstrous wrong against humanity in the interests of Wall Street's
chosen few,"'1 30 or to punish left-wing political dissidents who called
colorfully but abstractly for "annihilation of the bourgeois parliamentary
129. These are among the "fundamental principles" that the European Court
consistently reiterates as a preface to its Article 10 decisions relating to punishment of
antigovernment speech. See, e.g., Zana v. Turkey, App. No. 18954/91, 27 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 667, 689, para. 51 (1997).
130. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 50, 51 (1919) (Justice Holmes
paraphrasing the content of the defendant's leaflet).
state."'13 1 In the times in which we live, however, calling directly for
participation in a particular unlawful act is no longer the only effective
means of inducing large numbers of individuals to consider resorting to
violence. Judge Hand conceded years ago that inciting others to take
action "may be accomplished as well by indirection as expressly, since
words carry the meaning that they impart."' 132 He went on to insist that
only the purest form of "direct incitement" should be punishable, but his
colleague Judge Hough may have had the better of the argument when
he wondered "whether there can be any more direct incitement to action
than to hold up to admiration those who do act.' ' 133 Effective incitement
can take many forms other than a straightforward call to take a
particular unlawful action. Deciding what kinds messages should qualify
as punishable incitement to unlawful action in an open society will
therefore constitute one of the most urgent and perplexing challenges facing
lawmakers and judges in the years ahead. 134
131. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 656 n.2 (1925) (text of the "Left Wing
Manifesto" distributed by the defendant).
132. Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
133. Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 245 F. 102, 106 (2d Cir. 1917).
134. On March 22, 2006, after six months of intensive debate, the United Kingdom
Parliament passed the Terrorism Act 2006. Section 1 of the Act outlawed any
"statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to
whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them
to the commission . . . of acts of terrorism." Section 1 goes on to specify that
"statements that are likely to be understood ... as indirectly encouraging . . . acts of
terrorism ... include every statement which-(a) glorifies the commission ... of such
acts . . . and (b) is a statement from which those members of the public could reasonably
be expected to infer that what is being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should
be emulated by them in existing circumstances."
The full text of the Terrorism Act 2006 is available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/
acts2006/ukpga 2006001 len.pdf.
